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Abstract
A distinctive feature of the rise of the multipolar world order in the 21st century
has been the proliferation of multilateral institutions. While the raison d’être
of these institutions essentially remains elevating multilateral interests, as
opposed to unilateral or even for that matter, bilateral interests, national interests
continue to remain paramount. Even within multilateral institutions, states
undertake various approaches to secure their own national interests over and
above that of others. BRICS, a multilateral grouping of Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa, in its conception is targeted towards reforming and
filling up the space left by the West dominated structures of global governance.
However, the power asymmetry inherent among the BRICS members creates
traction that the Chinese require to wield the kind of influence that should
concern other members, and certainly India. The dilemma of balancing common
interest and national interest within multilateral organisations like the BRICS
will be an eminent feature of the varied and multiple interest sets that countries
have in an interdependent world. While countries will still find purpose, in the
membership of multilateral institutions, the challenge of managing power
asymmetry within those organisations will mean that countries find leverage
through their engagement with countries outside those groups.
For China, the heavyweight within the group, BRICS has multiple purposes,
one of them being the elevation of Chinese interests of opposing Western
hegemony. However, for India, for which the grouping remains of pertinence
(given its stress on addressing emerging and important global challenges such
as those of economic development and sustainability) taking a position against
the so-called dominance of the West or aligning itself with any particular country
or group that stands in opposition to others is a dilemma.
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Introduction
Debates on the emerging multipolar structure of the international system have
been synonymous with the rise of China. The discourse on America’s relative
decline and the rise of new power centres has been dominated by China’s rise
and the geopolitical implications it has had. A distinctive feature of the rise of
the multipolar order in the twenty-first century has been the proliferation of
multilateral institutions. While the raison d’être of these institutions essentially
remains elevating multilateral interests, as opposed to unilateral or even for
that matter, bilateral interests, national interests continue to remain paramount.
Even within multilateral institutions, states undertake various approaches to
secure their own national interests over and above that of others. BRICS, a
multilateral grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, in its
conception is targeted towards reforming and filling up the space left by the
West dominated structures of global governance. However, BRICS grouping
also has another equally important objective; which is to elevate the respective
positions of each of these member countries’ position in the international system.
As such, BRICS faces a conundrum: how can it balance common interest with
competition and power play within the group?
The BRICS countries clearly have a significant role to play in the emerging
multipolar world order. The BRICS countries, in the last decade have contributed
to 50 per cent of the global economic growth. India and China, have the highest
growth rates in the grouping, and despite several avenues of disagreements in
the bilateral relationship, they find ample scope for cooperation in the BRICS.
However, the power asymmetry inherent among the BRICS members creates
traction that the Chinese require to wield the kind of influence that should
concern other members, and certainly India. China also intents on using the
multilateral organisations like BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to sync them with larger
objectives in projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, there
has been a clear divergence between India and China, when it comes to
countering terrorism, as Beijing often turns a blind eye to terrorists targeting
India, emanating from Pakistan. Moreover, increasing U.S.-China strategic
competition, the trade war between the two, nosediving U.S.-Russia relations
and better ties between India and the U.S. creates a geo-political situation
bringing Moscow and Beijing closer. China’s opposition to India’s candidature
as a veto-wielding member of a reformed United Nations and India’s membership
shot at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) further create divergences between
India and China beyond the existing tenacious boundary dispute.
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Hence, China’s position within the BRICS by dint of being the largest
economy within the group remains an issue of policy concern that merits a
conceptual analysis and assessment. This article attempts to carry out a
conceptual inquiry into the notion of multilateralism and multilateral institutions
as a feature of the emerging multipolar world order. Countries like China and
India have openly projected that their interests will be better served in a
multipolar world order. However, the practice of multilateralism through
multilateral institutions in a multipolar world does not preclude the notion of
power asymmetry. In case of multilateral organisations like the BRICS, China’s
economic size lends it a playing field, which could eat into the means by which
other members would protect and promote their interest. As such, the article
attempts to juxtapose the conceptual background with an empirical understanding
of why China needs BRICS, how and why China dominates the BRICS and
what it means for India. Last but not the least, the article also attempts to argue
as to what all these mean for the future of BRICS multilateralism.
Incentivising Cooperation amidst Competition
How do countries like India and China whose interactions are usually identified
with competition, if not conflict, incentivise cooperation? Besides their bilateral
interactions and a number of confidence building measures, specifically over
their border dispute, how do they use memberships and partnerships in multilateral
institutions for building habits of cooperation? Are these efforts successful and
how do they play out in the midst of strategic rivalry? Do multilateral institutions
necessarily provide a way out from the security dilemma inherent in the relationship
between India and China?1 Multilateral institutions and multilateral ways of inter-
state arrangements have become the catchphrase of the emerging multipolar world
order.2 Robert Keohane defines multilateralism ‘as the practice of co-ordinating
national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements
or by means of institutions.’3 According to him, institutions are a ‘persistent and
connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that pre- scribe behavioural roles,
constrain activity, and shape expectations.’ Multilateral institutions, Keohane says
are, “multilateral arrangements with persistent sets of rules; they can be
distinguished from other forms of multilateralism, such as ad hoc meetings and
short-term arrangements to solve particular problems.” At the heart of institutions
is also bargaining among the members of those institutions to align interests and
common objectives. While bargaining may be geared towards a win-win scenario,
the role of power in the process is undeniable.4
Since cooperation in a multilateral institution is not guaranteed but has to
be negotiated at all times, to what extent influential members in a multilateral
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institution might be able to and willing to negotiate the terms of arrangement to
their favour and to the detriment of others remains a matter of discourse.5 The
debate on an emerging multipolar world order has gained momentum in recent
times. Though multipolarity comes with the notion of multiple centers of power,
giving more space for creating leverages to protect and promote one’s interest,
it also does not prevent stronger powers in the system from using their
predominant powers to advance their interests at the cost of others.6
Such predominance is also reflected in multilateral institutions, where a
country that has contributed more material capabilities as opposed to other
members might create more leverage for itself.7 Multilateral mechanisms and
memberships in multilateral institutions are means in which countries create
value out of cooperation. However, the paradox remains that countries, after
all, are self-interested actors who would either spearhead the creation of certain
multilateral institutions, or seek membership in them, only if it serves certain
purposes.8 However, what are the circumstances in which the predominance of
a country in multilateral institutions start diluting the multilateral ways of the
institution? Does power asymmetry and the intentions of the leading country;
limit the traction of other members? In what ways a predominant country set
the agenda favourable to its own interests, and how conditions of power
asymmetry constrain the negotiating space of other members?9 What are the
incentives that a country, like China, with a substantial power of the purse, can
give to other member countries in a multilateral set-up?
It is also fair to say that an aspiring hegemon would want to engineer various
multilateral institutions and spearhead the decision-making, to make easier
compliance and cooperation with other countries. Sustaining hegemony would
require the maintenance of various multilateral mechanisms like the way the
Americans spearheaded the Bretton Woods institutions post World War II. The
farsightedness of a hegemon would not be in amassing power alone, but in
managing the power through effective public distribution of goods.10 The
leadership of multilateral institutions could be seen as a way to create legitimacy
for predominance in the international system. The assumption that
multilateralism naturally leads to cooperative behaviour and win-win outcomes
has to be critically questioned in the context of the existence of power asymmetry
within the institutions, and how stronger countries utilise that asymmetry. China’s
engagement in multilateral institutions reflects its pragmatic and realpolitik
considerations. If multilateral organisations like the BRICS are the order of an
emerging multipolar world order, then China’s perception of BRICS as a major
component of its rise and its external engagement is reflective of its intention to
use BRICS to institutionalise its economic leadership of the global order. In an
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increasingly interdependent world, multilateral organisations like the BRICS
are imperative to coordinate the convergent interests and manage divergent
ones. However, the efficacy of such institutions to generate “mutual benefits”
is not preordained and China’s capability and intention to influence multilateral
organizations like the BRICS to serve its own national interest will create more
complexities for other member countries like India, which shares complex
dynamics of competition and cooperation with China.11 The following section
will delve deeper into the question as to why China needs the BRICS.
China’s Prominence within the BRICS
China holds sway over all the other countries, be it in terms of its share in world
trade or in terms of its GDP. A cursory look at statistics from WTO and IMF from
2017 reveals that while China’s share in world total exports was 12.77 per cent,
Brazil’s share was 1.23, while it was 1.99 percent, 1.68 per cent and 0.50 per cent
for Russia, India and South Africa respectively. In terms of GDP (purchasing
power parity), Brazil’s was USD 3.240 trillion, Russia’s was USD 4.007 trillion,
India’s was USD 9.459 trillion, South Africa’s was USD 765 billion, while
China’s stood at the highest amongst the five at USD 23.159 trillion.12
In fact, China has just about enough money accumulated on its international
reserves to equal the economic output of Brazil, Russia and South Africa.13 Its
state owned enterprises (SOEs) have the funding to buy strategic assets abroad
like water, oil and gas infrastructure. Brazil’s dependence on China has been
revealed by an examination of the bilateral trade between the two countries.
Overall, trade between China and Brazil has seen a positive evolution in the
decade 2006–2016. From a trade volume of approximately US$ 20 billion in
2006, trade increased to approximately US$ 68 billion in 2016. This means
that, from 2006 to 2016, the volume of trade between the two countries more
than tripled.14 Agribusiness is one of the largest sectors of the Brazilian economy.
The country leads the rankings in soybean exports and is known worldwide for
meat and oil exports.15 Brazil is immensely dependent on China for its soybeans
and iron ore exports. In fact, in May 2017, the two countries launched a joint
investment fund to increase productive capacity, and the fund reportedly will
finance investment projects in Brazil that are of interest to both the sides.
China is already Russia’s largest trading partner, offsetting any impact
of geopolitical uncertainty from the West. Bilateral trade grew from US$ 69.6
billion in 2016 to US$ 107.1 billion last year, with China as Russia’s largest
individual partner in both exports and imports.16 President Xi Jinping has visited
Moscow more than any other capital since he assumed power. Last June, he
awarded Russian President Vladimir Putin China’s first-ever friendship medal,
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honouring him as “my best, most intimate friend”.17 Commodities supply,
opposition to what they perceive as attempts at Western hegemony, and a
purported desire for a multipolar world are the commonalities driving the
bilateral engagement between Russia and China. India’s imports are heavily
dependent on China, and the bilateral trade in 2017 rose by 18.63 per cent year-
on-year to reach USD 84.44 billion.18 South Africa is China’s biggest trading
partner in the African continent and it needs Chinese investment and Chinese
buyers for its raw materials, and China is its biggest export market, accounting
for around USD 12 billion.19
Therefore, the economic clout, which enabled China’s rise at the international
stage, is the same factor underlying China’s preponderance within the BRICS,
which enables it over others to steer the direction of the BRICS as per its
worldview. However, for a country like India, which has its own perception of
global politics and is an important pole in the current international order, such
preponderance of China has implications, which might not be in the positive.
The following section looks at the implications of Chinese preponderance in
the BRICS has for India.
Why China Needs the BRICS?
An observation of China’s membership of organisations reveals a sharp contrast
between the initial decades post liberation, and those of the 2000s. By 2000,
China had become a member of over 50 intergovernmental organisations and
1275 international nongovernmental organisations, and this was in sharp contrast
with the situation in 1966 when it was a member of only one intergovernmental
organisation and 58 international nongovernmental organizations.20 This change
in membership has been underlined with China’s changing attitude towards
international organizations. China formally recognises international
organizations as subjects of international law, but does not accord them a
supranational status, in the way a political entity would have it. An example of
this lies in the way China rejected the Hague Tribunal’s ruling on China’s
aggressive claims in the South China Sea, and China questioned even the basis
of existence of the tribunal.21 However, at the same time, China is increasingly
acquiring memberships of international, regional and multilateral organizations.
It has even been creating organisations to rally around causes that it deems fit
for lobbying in the international arena. Therefore, on the one hand, China looks
to organisations to confer international prestige, status and domestic legitimacy,
while on the other it prefers to usage of bilateral mechanisms for the resolution
of interstate or intrastate conflicts,22 viewing international relations from a realist
perspective over a liberal one.
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The interesting aspect about China’s attitude towards organisations can be
seen in the ones that it has created and is the most powerful member of in the
grouping. An example of this is the BRICS grouping. While the origins of the
grouping go back to 2001 when the economic growth rates of the member
countries were the highest in the world, fact remains that the five countries
have nothing to bind them together. They are in four different continents, have
different political as well as market structures and are no longer the fastest
growing economies in the world. Growth rates of these five countries’ economies
have slid from over 8 and 9 per cent to a best case of slightly above 6 per cent
to a worst case of under 4 per cent.23 In 2015, Goldman Sachs itself folded its
BRICS fund into a general emerging market fund on the grounds that this fund
lost almost 88 per cent of its assets since a 2010 peak.24 At best, the group has
become a multilateral forum for China to establish some form of new global
order. For China, the Bretton Woods institutions like the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) represent the status quo, which is why it
has been actively promoting multilateral forums like the BRICS.
A closer look at the 10th edition of the BRICS summit held in 2018 as well
as the 11th edition held in 2019 reveals how the BRICS is an important platform
for China. The BRICS countries, at the end of the three-day summit in 2018
stated that they want a fairer and more representative global order in diplomacy
and trade.25 They also stated that they seek reforms at the United Nations, UN
Security Council (UNSC) and the IMF for better representation of developing
countries and have asked that the members of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), including the US abide by its rules. The organisations wherein changes
have been sought are all Western ones.
The 11th BRICS Summit’s declaration is no different, and it uses the exact
same words regarding reforms of the UN system as had been in 2018. The
statement pertaining to the reform of the UN is as follows:
We recall the 2005 World Summit Outcome document and reaffirm the
need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council,
with a view to making it more representative, effective and efficient, and to
increase the representation of the developing countries so that it can
adequately respond to global challenges. China and Russia reiterate the
importance they attach to the status and role of Brazil, India and South
Africa in international affairs and support their aspiration to play a greater
role in the UN.26
However, despite reiteration of the same fact year after year in the BRICS
Declarations, ground realities remain different. Even though China also calls
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for a reform of the UN, the irony lies in the fact that it actively blocks India’s
candidature at the UNSC and there are reservations in both China as well as
Russia regarding an expansion of the UNSC to include more developing
countries, which will make the UN more representational.27 The tone in BRICS
declarations has been heavily weighing in favour of the agenda China. In 2018,
the BRICS summit was taking place with backdrop of the trade war between
the U.S. and China, because of which there were repeated references made to
the necessity for free trade. 2019 was no different and at the 11th BRICS Summit
held in Brasilia, veiled references to the U.S.’ withdrawal from multilateralism
was evident. In a separate section titled ‘economic and financial cooperation’,
the 11th BRICS declaration mentioned how since the last meeting, global
economic growth has weakened and downside risks have increased as trade
tensions and policy uncertainty have taken a toll on confidence, trade, investment
and growth.28 Out of the five countries in the grouping, the country that has
benefited the most from an export led growth model and international trade is
China. Therefore, even though the other four have been impacted by the slowing
economy and the US’ attempts at import substitution, China has been hit the
worst. Therefore, being the most dominant member of the grouping, its concerns
come up more often than those of the others.
Free trade again ironically is something that China does not really permit
when it comes to imports in to China, as revealed by the IMF’s annual report
card on the Chinese economy, which criticises the pervasive role of the state in
the economy and the restrictive trade and investment regime of the country.29
Nevertheless, through the BRICS, China signalled to the world that it is building
a coalition of emerging markets that seek to defend the current multilateral
trade regime.
In the summits held earlier, as stated by Martyn Davies, managing director
for emerging markets and Africa at Deloitte, there has never been an agenda
before, and BRICS as a group talking about liberalised trade has never been
witnessed.30 Now trade is at the front and foremost. The full text of the declaration
mentions the terms “free” and “trade” the maximum number of times over and
above the others.31 The case is the same even in the 2019 declaration. Therefore,
even though the BRICS is a symbol of multilateralism, it is clear that even
within multilateral organisations, there is bound to be the preponderance of the
most powerful countries- in the case of BRICS, it is China. The point to note
nevertheless is that this is not the first time that the declarations have political
underpinnings.32 Even in the past declarations, what has been witnessed is an
inclination to counter the Western dominance in global institutions. However,
over the years, China has loomed large over the content of the declarations.
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For example, stated already, 2018 and 2019 have been characterised by the
trade spat between the US and China, which is why the reference to free trade
in the BRICS declaration. The previous year, China called for the inclusion of
more like-minded countries in the BRICS grouping.33 While expansion of the
grouping helps China enlarge its group against Western institutions and in tilting
the balance of power in its favour, fact remains that for members like India,
expansion of the grouping is not of much pertinence. Therefore, until the previous
summits, the grouping was of use for China for the formation of an anti-West
coalition, which as seen in recent summits has now also become about agenda
setting. The question, which emerges from this, is how China comes to be the
agenda setter or have a more prominent stature within the BRICS over the
other members.
Implications for India
India and China are the two lynchpins of the BRICS grouping in terms of
economic growth rates and trade. However, the relationship between these two
countries is fraught with tensions. To begin with, while China emphasises on
free trade, Indian products in China suffer enormous tariff as well as non-tariff
barriers and despite decades of calling China’s attention, the balance of trade
continues to weigh heavily in China’s favour.34 For China, ensuring its continued
economic growth is essential, given the fact that its clout in the international
system is based on its economic might. Therefore, continued as well as larger
access for Chinese products in different markets across the globe is of utmost
importance for China. For India, which is attempting to unleash its manufacturing
prowess through programmes such as Make in India, similar access for Indian
products is essential. However, most markets are saturated with Chinese
products, and within the Chinese market, Indian products suffer trade distortions.
Additionally, while at BRICS summits, China speaks of a more just
international order and reforms of institutions, fact remains that it actively blocks
India’s participation at forums such as the UNSC or the NSG. This actually
symbolises Chinese double speak and the lack of a suitable Indian response so
far to counter the double speak.
China’s ability to steer the entire BRICS discourse to an agenda that it
deems fit is also of concern for India. For example, the anti-West stance taken
by the BRICS, spearheaded by China at last year’s summit is not something
that works perfectly for India. For India, a strong working relationship with the
West is critical to its autonomous material development, and for furthering its
regional and global aspirations. Similarly, the idea of BRICS plus floated by
China at last year’s summit would negatively impact India, as the BRICS
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grouping would lose its focus after expansion and it would get reduced to a
political platform for furthering Chinese global aspirations! While China expands
its influence by inviting its allies, India would not just endanger its friendships
in the West due to the increasingly anti-West stance Beijing would propagate,
India’s role and voice within the grouping itself also might get lost.
As has been previously witnessed, China’s clout within the BRICS has led
to India’s concerns being swept under the rug. Despite the rhetoric on counter
terrorism, India’s efforts to call out China’s all weather friend Pakistan for its
anti-India terrorist outfits at the international stage has often met the Chinese
wall.35 Another example where Chinese influence within the BRICS has not
worked to India’s advantage is that if the New Development Bank. Even though
it was India, which proposed the idea of the Bank under BRICS, China through
some hefty diplomacy was able to get the Bank established in Shanghai. A
hegemonic status of China within the BRICS clearly does not cater well for
India and in no way can lead to mutually beneficial outcomes. The need is that
the BRICS countries pin down China on long terms norm based values, ideas
and concrete proposals and programmes for the mutual benefit of the constituent
member states!36
Wither BRICS Multilateralism
The Chinese government has often promoted multipolarity as an order more
commensurate with a ‘harmonious world’ as opposed to unipolar dominance
by the United States. China’s support for a multipolar world order has been
seen as reflected in its promotion of multilateral institutions. However, as argued,
the overwhelming volume of the Chinese economy compared to the other BRICS
member countries including India, portends a strategic concern for India. China
espouses a harmony between its support for multilateral institutions and a ‘fairer’
world order. However, many view China’s approach as one that emphasises the
promotion and protection of its national interests over anything else, which
entails more bargaining power for itself, improve its economic profile and contain
the predominance of the United States, more particularly in the economic
domain.37
While China, by dint of the sheer size of its material capabilities, is taken as
an inevitable member of many multilateral institutions in the world, its intention
to be a responsible player in regional and global agenda setting is still viewed
with scepticism. Its intransigent approach towards the contentious South China
Sea dispute, its hesitancy to take efforts to correct the imbalance in its bilateral
trade with India and its constant refusal to support India’s candidature for a
permanent seat at the UNSC raises a number of questions on China’s approach
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to multilateralism and multilateral institutions. There is no doubt that a member
of any multilateral organization such as the BRICS would do their own cost-
benefit analysis of what they give and get by becoming a part of such groups.
However, the dynamism of the differing capabilities and the power asymmetry
it creates within those groups presents a foreign policy dilemma for the weaker
powers. Rising economies like India and China do have a convergent interest in
making sure that the global financial structure does not remain dominated by the
American and Western European economies. However, for India, a global financial
structure dominated by the Chinese economy will not augur well as far as
maintaining India’s independent decision-making is concerned. The Chinese
government propagates its support for multilateral organisations like the BRICS
as being in commensurate with its notion of ‘peaceful rise’.
Member countries like India have found it difficult to negotiate its own
influence in the international system through the BRICS forum; as in the case
of China’s reticence to discuss the issue of UNSC reform with permanent seat
aspirants like India and Brazil.38 As such, there is an apparent dilemma of
managing power asymmetry in multilateral organisations, which is palpable in
terms of China’s position within the BRICS. The dilemma of balancing common
interest and national interest within multilateral organisations like the BRICS
will be an eminent feature of the varied and multiple interest sets that countries
have in an interdependent world. While countries will still find purpose, in the
membership of multilateral organisations, the challenge of managing power
asymmetry within those organizations will mean that countries find leverage
through their engagement with countries outside those groups. This is clearly
reflected in the limitations of India-China cooperation within the BRICS and
India’s engagement with a country like the United States, whose dominance in
the global financial structure, groups like the BRICS wants to challenge.
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